The behaviour of oligopolistic firms is a source of considerable debate and concern, given their market power and ability to shape the development of new markets. A key area of debate concerns the scope for strategic adaptation in oligopolies; and in particular, the extent to which such large and otherwise successful firms ignore or marginalize important shifts in the marketplace. In this article, I critically evaluate these general theoretical issues through the lens of a specific, geographically bounded case study: the collision between Hollywood, a mature oligopoly comprising six studios, and the Internet, a decentralized architecture that has made possible peer-topeer (P2P) file sharing between networked computers. I argue that in a secure form (enforced by 'digital rights management' software), file sharing has considerable promise for all copyright owners, including the studios. I examine the oligopolistic behaviour of the studios in response to the Internet, and in particular, their response to an alternative mode of peerbased film distribution, oriented around legal, paid-for file sharing. I argue that the studios are trying to preserve the oligopolistic structure of the industry in a digital age by promoting an inefficient and restrictive 'design' for Internet distribution, oriented around centralized server-client architectures, which provides tight control over digital commodities and minimizes the disruptive impact of the Internet. This behaviour must be understood in light of the social and economic incentives that influence executives, as well as the context in which decision-making takes place. Nonetheless, their response also raises some worrying questions about the future shape of creativity, distribution and consumption in the film industry (and in the broader realm of media and entertainment) in a digital and networked economy. The article is based on over 150 interviews with elites in the studios and other related firms in the Los Angeles region.
Introduction: the behaviour of oligopolistic firms
Since Cournot, the behaviour of oligopolistic firms has been debated, contested and refined, resulting in myriad theoretical frameworks (see Shapiro, 1988) . In general, oligopolistic firms are characterized by the following distinct behaviour: collusion, strategic interdependence, the maximization of revenues and the preservation of industry structure (Baumol, 1958; Stigler, 1964) . The executives who manage these firms have incentives to focus on larger and proven markets, so as to sustain a stable rate of growth and protect the market capitalization of the firm (Caves and Porter, 1978) . There is a tendency for oligopolists to neglect or even marginalize emerging markets, especially those that are seen to threaten the status quo. Therefore, the behaviour of oligopolistic firms tends to reflect, defend and enforce the prevailing structure of the industry, making any kind of radical change difficult to justify or initiate. In theory, cultural inertia can develop in any large firm with an established market share; but is particularly pronounced in oligopolies, where the economics of market concentration add greater urgency, in the eyes of executives, to protectionist strategies. The strategic behaviour of oligopolistic firms is the source of considerable debate and concern, given their ability to shape, or stunt, the development of new and potentially valuable markets. There is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that oligopolies can be economically and socially damaging, as they tend to favour higher prices, greater control and lower levels of consumer choice over the long run (Posner, 2001) .
In this article, I critically examine the strategic behaviour of firms in a mature and concentrated oligopolistic industry-the US film industry, which is dominated by the following six Hollywood studios, based in Los Angeles: Disney, Fox, Paramount, Sony Pictures, Universal and Warner Bros. The economic geography of this oligopoly has changed dramatically over the past century, but its lead firms have essentially remained constant (albeit with various changes in ownership and title). In particular, the 'classical era' of mass production in Hollywood (dating from the 1920s to the 1950s) was gradually replaced by a 'New Hollywood' (from the 1960s onwards) (see Scott, 2002 Scott, , 2005 . The studios survived this transition, but the process fundamentally reconfigured the basis of their oligopolistic power. As Christopherson and Storper (1986) presciently observed, the New Hollywood was premised upon two key structural changes. First, film production underwent vertical disintegration and spatial dislocation, leading to the rise of a 'transactions-intensive' entertainment complex in Los Angeles, and the emergence of satellite production clusters in other countries (Coe, 2001) . Second, film marketing and distribution underwent a process of vertical integration and globalization, as the studios were subsumed into larger international conglomerates. As a result of these changes, the studios have increasingly functioned as gatekeepers (rather than film factories), which control access to the finances required to produce, market and distribute films (and related spin-off products) in major markets around the world (Compaine and Gomery, 2000) .
Today, the studios account for over 90% of revenues in the US film industry, which continues to consolidate (as witnessed by the Sony-led acquisition of MGM in late 2004, Paramount's acquisition of Dreamworks in late 2005 and Disney's acquisition of Pixar Animation in early 2006). The six studios are now divisions within a broader circuit of copyright capital, which in turn is dominated by a so-called media oligopoly (see Table 1 ). This broader oligopoly comprises five firms (Bertelsmann, News Corporation, Time Warner, Viacom and Walt Disney), which are supplemented by other firms (e.g. General Electric, parent of NBC Universal and Sony Corp.) through co-financing deals, strategic alliances and interlocking directorates (see Bagdikian, 2004) . The media oligopoly (and its constituent divisions) exhibits the classic features of oligopoly: there is a limited degree of product-based competition; and the lead firms regularly co-operate to enhance the exposure and value of their products. Together, these firms control the most lucrative domains of media and entertainment (namely, films, music, radio, cable television, newspapers, magazines and books) in the US, and increasingly in Europe, as well as emerging markets across Asia and Latin America.
My specific focus in this article is the collision between the Hollywood studios and the Internet-a decentralized electronic architecture that has enabled peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing between networked computers. The article has two broad goals. First, I argue that file sharing over the Internet has considerable commercial promise for all copyright owners, including the Hollywood studios. It heralds a radically new mode of economic reproduction, oriented around increased consumer participation (and concomitantly, reduced oligopolistic control) in the production, marketing and distribution of digital commodities. Second, I then examine the oligopolistic behaviour of the studios in response to the emergence of file sharing. In doing so, I argue that the studios are trying to preserve the oligopolistic structure of the industry, in a digital age, by promoting an inefficient and restrictive business model, oriented around centralized server-client architectures, which provides tight control over digital commodities and minimizes the disruptive impact of the Internet. However, the oligopolistic behaviour of the studios must be understood in light of the social and economic incentives that influence executives, as well as the context in which decision-making takes place. My research discovered that studio executives openly recognize the projected benefits of legal file sharing, but that they have limited incentives to pursue emerging markets at an early stage in their development, especially when those markets are unproven and disruptive to the status quo. Instead, these executives have powerful incentives to protect the existing spatial and temporal structure of 'release windows', which is currently dominated by a physical commodity form-sales of the 'digital versatile disc' (DVD) format. As we will see, this strategic behaviour is rational and fiscally advisable in the short-term (as it seeks to minimize risk and maximize quarterly earnings); but it is suboptimal and potentially damaging (to consumers, creators and even the oligopoly) in the long-term. This article stems from an ongoing research project, which critically examines the incorporation of the Internet into the US film industry, and other copyright industries, in a legalized commercial form (Currah, 2003 (Currah, , 2006 . To date, the research has comprised over 150 interviews with senior executives in the studios and related firms (e.g. equity analysts, consultants, producers, technologists, lawyers, etc.). Of course, the research that is presented here is geographically and temporally bound: it offers a snapshot of a particular stage of technological and structural change in the US film industry. However, the article also contributes to more general theoretical debates. First, it dovetails with existing debates about the nature of organizational adaptation in mature industries, the influence of vested interests and sunk costs, and the extent to which managers in incumbent firms overlook new technologies, despite overwhelming evidence to merit a strategic response (Clark, 1994; Christensen, 1997; Schoenberger, 1997) . Second, it also adds to a new and burgeoning realm of economicgeographical research, which is concerned with the contingent and situated nature of Internet-based business models in a range of sectors, countries and regions (Aoyama, 2001; Wrigley et al., 2002; Leyshon et al., 2004) . Third, the article sheds light on a much broader debate about the economics and changing structure of the media and entertainment industries in a digital and networked socio-economic environment (Lessig, 2002 (Lessig, , 2004 . It is this issue, especially, that frames the remainder of the article.
Today, the firms that dominate these industries (the constituents of the so-called 'media oligopoly') are built on what might be termed a 'centralized' mode of reproduction, which seeks to hoard, defend and exploit intellectual property through legal instruments such as copyrights and trademarks (Bollier, 2005) .
1 The natural tendency in these firms is to eliminate the unauthorized use of their intellectual property, and in turn, maximize the economic value of each product. As I show in this article (through the lens of the Hollywood studios), the Internet collides with centralized approaches to the economic reproduction of intellectual property, and challenges the media oligopoly to devise new ways of generating revenues from digital commodities. In particular, the Internet makes possible a new decentralized (or peer-based) model for the economic reproduction of intellectual property, which should reinvigorate creativity and enhance the matching of supply and demand in distribution. As such, it has the realistic potential to increase overall industry revenues and even strengthen the reproduction of oligopolies (albeit within a more competitive and 'polyphonic' landscape, comprising new and otherwise marginalized creative voices). Crucially, the Internet is not of interest because it portends the displacement of oligopolies, which are a logical and enduring organizational response to the asymmetric and volatile performance of media and entertainment in physical or digital formats. (That is, market uncertainty tends towards risk-minimization through market concentration and economies of scale.) Rather, the Internet is of interest and importance because it is bringing about a dramatic increase in consumer choice and a relative decline in centralized oligopolistic control in these markets. However, the speed and extent of this shift is being threatened by the media oligopoly, in a desperate effort to protect its 'twentieth century business model of industrial cultural production' (Benkler, 2004, p. 353) .
Therefore, this article utilizes a specific sample of intellectual property owners in the media oligopoly (the Hollywood studios) to deconstruct and conceptualize this broader and contested process of industrial transformation. It is necessarily limited but provides a small step towards theory-building in this realm of interdisciplinary debate. The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I examine the emergence of P2P file sharing, and its implications for the realm of media and entertainment. In Section 3, I explain why legal file sharing actually holds considerable promise for all copyright owners, with reference to recent business models in this area. In Section 4, I examine the oligopolistic agenda of the studios, and then in Section 5, I seek to explain their behaviour with reference to the incentives and context that influence executive decision-making. I conclude the article by considering the future prospects and challenges facing the commercial development of file sharing on the Internet.
The emergence of P2P file sharing
From the 1970s onwards, the Internet was harnessed and developed to facilitate the efficient exchange of articles, data and other scholarly information between peers in the world of academia. As it evolved, the Internet laid the foundations for a decentralized P2P architecture, which socialized and normalized the sharing of digital files (Barbrook, 1998; Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2001) . Over time, the boundaries of the Internet have spilled beyond academia into new realms, enabling all kinds of digital files to be shared at virtually zero marginal cost. The development of P2P file-sharing technology has been critical in this respect, as it enables computer users to directly share a folder of content with other users on a particular network.
Napster codified and popularized the concept of P2P file sharing in the late 1990s. It provided a simple graphical user interface and access to an extensive registry of computers, which in turn contained a veritable cornucopia of digital music (Leyshon, 2001) . The key to Napster's success was that it radically simplified the act of giving and receiving digital music files over the Internet, and therefore facilitated much greater user participation in what had previously been an arcane 'gift economy' dominated by enthusiasts and hobbyists (Leyshon, 2004) . Nonetheless, the centralized structure of Napster (which comprised several master servers) left it vulnerable to legal action by the record industry, eventually leading to its demise in 2001. More recently, P2P networks such as Bit Torrent, Kazaa and Grokster have developed a truly decentralized approach to file sharing (using networks of 'super nodes' rather than central servers), which has in part shielded these operators against legal and regulatory intervention by copyright owners. A defining characteristic of these networks is that they include myriad digital files-not just music, but also documents, images, video and software. Indeed, they also incorporate innovative technologies such as 'swarming downloads', whereby large files (such as films, television shows and video games) are disintegrated into smaller chunks that can then be sourced from multiple peers simultaneously (thereby accelerating the speed of file sharing).
Today, the level of traffic on the latest P2P file-sharing networks continues to grow. According to the Distributed Computing Industry Association, for example, the average number of users worldwide on P2P networks has steadily increased, from 4.32 million in September 2003 to 6.78 million in September 2004 to 9.28 million in September 2005 (see http://www.dcia.info). It is estimated that P2P file sharing now accounts for over one-third of total Internet traffic (OECD, 2004) . Moreover, the distribution of legally authorized files over the Internet (from digital music stores, such as iTunes, which rest on a 'centralized' server-client interface) is still overshadowed by the volume of file sharing in the P2P networks. For example, the global market for legal music downloads in 2005 was valued at 450 million digital songs, translating into roughly 8.6 million downloads per week (of which 80% took place through iTunes). In comparison, analysts estimate that, during the same period, over 24 billion songs were downloaded for free from P2P networks-that is, over 460 million downloads per week. Similarly, the free exchange of larger files such as films and video games is also expanding, owing to ongoing improvements in compression software and the deployment of faster Internet connections. On the basis of my research, it is fair to assume that at least 2 billion Hollywood films (i.e. that are owned by the six studios) are acquired over P2P networks each year worldwide.
2 And this figure is growing, as new technologies (e.g. recordable media, wireless connections, set top boxes, etc.) increasingly enable consumers to view downloaded content on a television rather than on a computer screen.
The rapid adoption of P2P technology by consumers worldwide, but particularly in Europe and North America, has imbued file sharing with a powerful sense of legitimacy and normality. The P2P networks have also improved access to the informational raw materials necessary for creative thought and expression, facilitating new forms of appropriation, tinkering and modification among consumers and existing producers (at least those with the requisite skills and hardware to undertake such activities). There are signs of a simple yet powerful desire-among the growing ranks of the 'digital literati'-to have Internet access to our cultural and historical record, and to be able to build on this resource and recombine it into new forms (Lasica, 2005) . These are the sociocultural hallmarks of the so-called 'rip, mix, burn' generation (as popularized by Apple Computer). For example, musicians and film-makers now regularly mix content from different sources and genres into their work, which is then disseminated through P2P networks, as well as other online and offline outlets. Some film-makers have even edited existing films, to remove content that is deemed objectionable or redundant, with the result that a wide range of 'filtered' films can now be found on the file-sharing networks. Overall, the P2P networks (and the Internet in general) represent an abundant 'informational commons', which has the unique capacity to 'liberate individual creativity and enrich social discourse by thoroughly democratizing the way we produce information and culture' (Benkler, 2002) . 3 The emergence of P2P file sharing has attracted the legal wrath of powerful copyright owners such as the record labels and Hollywood studios because it has enabled unacceptable and disruptive forms of consumer behaviour. In particular, these firms have argued that the free distribution of copyrighted files between consumers, via the Internet, poses a direct and unprecedented threat to their economic reproduction, not least because file sharing has grown fastest in the markets that represent the bulk of their revenues-North America and Western Europe (Leyshon et al., 2005) . In theory, this appears to be true: P2P file sharing facilitates the substitution of commodities with free downloads, and thereby enhances the 'non-excludability' and 'non-rivalry' (or public good characteristics) of digital content such as music, film and software (Bettig, 1996; Caves, 2000) . That is to say, these commodities can be consumed in a digital form without any rivalry or scarcity, making it difficult for copyright owners to effectively exclude non-payers from accessing the content. The situation is compounded by the high costs of production, and in tandem, the volatile and unpredictable performance of these commodities in the marketplace. The media oligopoly basically seeks to maximize profits from a handful of blockbuster hits to subsidize the losses incurred by other investments.
In this context, the record labels and studios have endeavoured to criminalize file sharing and so deter consumers from participating in P2P networks. They have done so by filing lawsuits against the providers of file-sharing software, and more recently, against consumers who are believed to be providing large amounts on a P2P network. The gaze of surveillance (and the threat of legal action) is designed to deter consumers and thereby eliminate the supply of content into the latest networks. In addition, the record labels and studios have constructed elaborate public awareness and educational campaigns (across the media and in US high schools), which frame P2P networks as spaces of danger and moral contagion where youngsters are at risk of being exposed to subversive digital content such as pornography, viruses and spyware. The overall attempt has been to construct an ethical code of practice surrounding digital content-that P2P file sharing is morally wrong and economically damaging to creative industries-to encourage consumers to 'self-regulate' their behaviour (in a rather Foucauldian fashion) along lines that respect the interests of copyright capital. Despite these efforts, file-sharing activity continues to blossom; and moreover, computer programmers are now seeking to build anonymous 'dark nets'-P2P networks that are completely impregnable to either regulatory surveillance or intervention (Lasica, 2005) .
The discourse promoted by the media oligopoly, in general, is rooted in the language of piracy, physical property and theft (Vaidhyanathan, 2001) . In their view, every free download represents a lost transaction and in turn, theft of expensive creative property. For example, the Motion Picture Association of America typically frames each free film download as the theft of property worth $142.9 million, which represents the average cost of producing, marketing and distributing a studio film to international audiences in 2004-2005-clearly, a substantial investment (see http://www.mpaa.org). Nonetheless, it is vital to recognize that there are fundamental differences between P2P file sharing and physical piracy, which remain concealed in the official discourse. First, the former is based on the free distribution of files between computer users, whereas the latter is generally oriented around the sale of illegal CDs and DVDs in pursuit of high profit margins. Second, the process of P2P file sharing serves to replicate non-rivalrous files, which can be reproduced and distributed at virtually zero marginal cost. In contrast, physical piracy circulates scarce and rivalrous commodities, which are constrained by the costs of recordable media (and associated computer hardware) as well as the friction of geographical distance and regulatory intervention (through border inspections and police raids). Despite these differences, the presence of free downloads, from P2P file-sharing networks, could in theory erode revenues in the media oligopoly (and even in the shadow pirate economy).
In practice, the economic relationship between P2P file sharing and industry revenues is still extremely unclear (see Condry, 2004; Ganley, 2004; Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004) . The well-documented decline in record sales from 2000-2003 roughly coincided with the rise of P2P file-sharing technology, but was also likely shaped by a broader global economic slowdown and competition from other forms of entertainment, such as DVDs, video games and ring tones (Freedman, 2003) . Meanwhile, there are no signs (as yet) to indicate that the presence of file sharing is leading to a direct and quantifiable reduction in revenues in the film industry. Whilst the pace of growth has begun to slow in the US theatrical exhibition market and the DVD market, both of these changes are generally ascribed to broader structural factors other than P2P file sharing-for example, consumer dissatisfaction with formulaic blockbuster concept films, as well as the onset of maturity in the DVD market as consumers wait for the next-generation technology to arrive. Going forward, however, the increased availability of the latest films on the P2P networks does pose a clear threat to studio revenues. Typically, the newest films now appear online within a day of theatrical exhibition, as a result of insider leaks (during post-production and pre-release marketing) and/or camcorders being smuggled into theatres. This means that file sharing (and by default, physical piracy) now occur at an earlier point in the lifecycle of a film, potentially inflicting greater damage on overall revenues (Vogel, 2005) . Even so, this assumes that consumers will automatically substitute legally authorized commodities with free downloads from the Internet. Instead, it might be more plausible to suggest that the presence of file sharing has multifaceted impacts on consumer behaviour. The following scenarios can be posited (compare Lessig, 2004) .
First, consumers may sample commodities on a P2P network before committing to a purchase, online or offline. In this regard, P2P file sharing possibly functions as a promotional space for media and entertainment, an equivalent to radio airplay or film previews. Second, P2P networks may expose consumers to otherwise invisible content, potentially leading to new sales, namely for more marginal artists 'for whom obscurity is a greater threat than piracy' (Proschinger, 2003, p. 102) . Third, consumers may download content that is either no longer commercially available or too costly to acquire offline. It is estimated, for example, that nearly 75% of the US record labels' libraries are no longer available in a commercial form (Lessig, 2004, p. 314) . Fourth, consumers can also download non-copyrighted content through P2P networks-for example, independent work or public domain titles. Thus, file sharing also has substantial 'non-infringing' uses. Fifth, and more generally, a strong argument can be made for the broader social welfare effects of file sharing. The sheer volume of content that is now being consumed via P2P networks (and other Internet-based sites) is likely to have an invigorating effect upon the creative basis of the media and entertainment industries, sparking new forms of experimentation, and in turn, consumption of new cultural forms (as described above).
In summary, commodities such as music and film are vulnerable to some degree of substitution because of P2P file sharing; but in practice, this is likely to be offset, in part, by increased sampling and delayed consumption. However, the current preoccupation with 'substitution effects' has largely been fuelled by the media oligopoly, which has discursively framed P2P file sharing as inimical to copyright owners. The key problem, it seems, is that file sharing has been conflated with physical piracy. The growth of file sharing does not mean that more consumers are developing criminal or pirate tendencies; rather, it is reflective of a broader cultural and economic shift, which is profoundly changing the way we produce, distribute and consume creative works in a digital form. Indeed, in a legalized form, P2P file-sharing networks provide a powerful and potentially lucrative outlet for digital commodities; but to date, the underlying potential of file-sharing technology has been shunned by the lead firms in the media oligopoly. I now want to review the commercial promise and emerging shape of legalized file sharing, before moving on to consider why the Hollywood studios have found it difficult to embrace a peer-based approach to film distribution.
The commercial promise of P2P file sharing
Everybody can't be an outlaw. If everybody does it, it's normal rather than aberrant behaviour. It's not so much the consumer who is on the wrong side of the law, but the entertainment industry that's on the wrong side of economic laws. (Wolf, 2003) P2P file sharing can actually be harnessed into a legalized and secure form. This is made possible by what is known as 'digital rights management' (DRM) software technology, which encodes computer files into a secure format, with a set of usage rules (stating when, where and how the file can be accessed) and a price determined by the copyright owner. The file can then be freely shared over the Internet, or even offline via recordable media, but remains locked until a usage license is purchased. DRM, however, arguably needs to balance the interests of creators, consumers and corporations. DRM protection should not simply attempt to thwart piracy and constrain the consumption of digital commodities in an authoritarian fashion, without regard for the delicate balance which has long existed in a physical and analogue world of distribution (and which, in theory, underpins the traditional doctrine of copyright law-see Lessig, 2002) . Rather, 'thin' forms of DRM (with deliberate imperfections) could help to imprint fair uses and derivative uses by consumers and creators into software code, which increasingly regulates our digital lives and activities (Lessig, 1999) . In a balanced form, legal file sharing has at least four key benefits for copyright owners, large and small.
First, the distributed and scalable structure of P2P networks means that they are more cost-efficient for storing and delivering large digital files, compared to traditional centralized server-client architectures, where costs increase in proportion to the size of the audience.
4 Second, it is economic to release any product onto a shared P2P network, irrespective of audience size or location, because the marginal costs of distribution are virtually zero. Thus, legal file sharing could enable copyright owners to extract greater value from niche products, which tend to be less visible and less lucrative in a physical world of distribution, where formulaic, mass appeal products tend to dominate (see Anderson, 2004 Anderson, , 2006 . Third, legal file sharing means that consumers can be rewarded for their role in a transaction, thereby encouraging users to share their content, computer storage and bandwidth with friends, family or even unknown peers. In turn, consumers would be encouraged to be 'citizens' rather than 'leeches', thereby resolving the problem of asymmetric participation, which plagues many of the current P2P networks. In the some of the latest networks, 50% of the shared content is supplied by only 1% of users (Leyshon, 2004; Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004) . Fourth, DRM technology enables content to be released in multiple formats and versions across regionally segmented markets (using 'geo-filtering' technologies). For example, consumers in a particular territory might be given free access to a degraded or abridged file prior to any purchase. In addition, DRM can be encoded with flexible rules that permit certain kinds of transformative use, possibly for a fixed fee. In this way, legal file sharing could simplify the remixing of digital content into new creative forms, thereby empowering future creators and generating entirely new revenues for existing copyright owners (see http://www.creativecommons.org).
Given these clear benefits, a range of trade bodies and consumer advocacy groups (such as the Distributed Computing Industry Association, Electronic Frontier Foundation, P2P United and Public Knowledge) have called for the media oligopoly to end its legal war against file sharing and to instead consider ways of commercializing the power and efficiency of P2P networks. In many other industries, for example, grid computing and P2P networks have already become the de facto standard for information management and retrieval systems (see Benkler, 2004) . The early legalization of P2P file sharing is taking place on the economic and creative margins of the media and entertainment industries, through the efforts of entrepreneurs and start-up firms, which have relied on venture capitalists (for seed capital) and independent creators and copyright owners (for content to license and distribute online) (see Currah, 2005) . The process has largely been driven by music, owing to the smaller size of digital music files, the popularity of media devices such as the iPod and the latent demand for legal alternatives to P2P networks (where over 2 billion music files are downloaded every month). However, many firms are now incorporating films and video games into their operations. At the time of writing, it is possible to discern at least four general business models for legal file sharing in the US market. As Table 2 shows, these models are oriented around the following services: file conversion; file seeding; file tracking; and centralized file sharing. In various ways, these models attempt to dovetail with consumer cultures and thereby promote the act of file sharing. The US Supreme Court ruling in MGM v Grokster (June, 2005) has accelerated the speed of innovation in this area, by conferring greater legitimacy upon models that marry the power of file sharing with the economic reproduction of copyright owners. In this context, there are now clear legal and economic incentives for innovators to experiment with different models for legal file sharing; and as a result, there is likely to be considerable diversification beyond the models shown in Table 2 in the coming years (e.g. free, advertising-supported models-see Fisher, 2004 Given the sustained growth and popularity of P2P file sharing, the media oligopoly has begun to consider ways of incorporating the technology into its business model, albeit in limited ways. For example, the US record labels have only agreed to license music to 'centralized' file-sharing services (namely, Mashboxx, SnoCap and Peer Impact), which coordinate and control file transfers between peers. In addition, the DRM favoured by the record labels tends to be overly protective and suspicious of the intentions of consumers, and therefore restricts the flexibility of nascent legal alternatives to file sharing. In general, the media oligopoly remains extremely wary of P2P file-sharing technology and exhibits a strong desire to preserve the status quo, which is broadly oriented around a 'centralized' and concentrated mode of reproduction. Historically, that is, the media oligopoly has been oriented around the maximization of revenues, the preservation of industry structure and the extension of control over the sale and post-purchase use of its commodities. P2P file-sharing challenges that approach, by making possible an alternative peer-based mode of economic reproduction that rests on reduced oligopolistic control and increased consumer participation (Benkler, 2004 (Benkler, , 2006 .
Ironically, it is entirely conceivable that, in a legalized form, P2P file sharing would actually increase the overall size of the market for media and entertainment, through the accurate matching of supply and demand, and through sparking new forms of creativity. As Boyle (2003, p. 43 ) has argued, a large leaky market is likely to generate more revenues than a smaller market over which control is much stronger. In the next section of the article, I examine in greater detail why a critical component of the media oligopoly (the Hollywood studios) has been resistant to legal file sharing. As I argue, executives in these firms have powerful incentives to 'fix' the Internet and hence make it compatible with the prevailing structure of the film industry, which is broadly organized around centralized control and the linear distribution of packaged commodities (in this case, DVDs).
'Fixing the Internet': the protectionist agenda of the Hollywood studios
The studios have publicly acknowledged the need for legal alternatives to P2P file sharing, where consumers can purchase and download films in a digital commodity form, in a flexible and affordable manner, for viewing on a computer or a television. Behind this rhetoric of consumer choice, however, the studios are attempting to mend the open and decentralized nature of the Internet and reshape it into a 'walled garden', where there is total control over content (with the help of DRM technology). The studios have used their power in the industry to impose what may be termed a 'protectionist design' (Utterback, 1996) -that is, a business model that seeks to protect the structure of the industry, rather than exploit the disruptive power of a new technology. Specifically, the model favoured by the studios is designed to incorporate the Internet into the industry with minimal disruption, so as to protect the behind a central programming guide). In addition, many of these firms have favoured relatively thin forms of DRM (some in conjunction with 'Creative Commons' licenses), fostering fair uses and derivative uses of independent content in a digital form. current spatial and temporal structure of film 'release windows', which are outlined below.
Over time, the studios have developed a complex system of release windows, which is carefully balanced to maximize the revenues from the distribution of each product. That is, films are made available to consumers in different formats at different prices over time through a series of well-defined and exclusive space-times (Scott, 2005) . The studios generate revenues from six principal release windows, as depicted in Table 3 : theatrical exhibition, home video, pay-per-view, pay-television, network television and syndicated television. The timing of these windows outside of the US varies by title and territory.
In 2004, the studios reported revenues of approximately $40 billion across these release windows. However, the distribution of revenues across windows is highly asymmetric. Since the late 1970s, 'home entertainment' has become the economic heart of the film industry, owing to the growth of home video formats (VHS and DVD) and the television after-market. The former accounts for 55% of revenues, whilst the latter accounts for 30% of revenues (Epstein, 2005) . A relatively tiny portion of revenues (10-15%) comes from theatrical exhibition. The majority of films do not become profitable until they enter the lucrative realm of home entertainment. Since the late 1990s, the DVD, in particular, has become the keystone of studio economics. In the process, DVDs have expanded the overall value of the home video market, largely by increasing video sales. For example, the US home video market (including rentals and sales) increased from $16.93 billion to $24.12 billion in 2004. As Table 4 shows, that expansion was powered by DVD sales, which grew from $0.24 billion to $15.15 billion in the period 1998-2004, more than offsetting the associated decline in VHS sales. DVD sales have provided the studios with the revenues to finance increasingly extravagant and expensive projects, loaded with spectacular special effects and star talent, resulting in a sustained output of high-budget films. Today, for example, the cost of producing and marketing a 'tent pole' film is estimated to be well over $200 million. The studios have favoured an economic model for Internet film distribution that protects the existing structure of windows, and specifically, the lucrative DVD-oriented home video window. The model favoured by the studios is oriented around a centralized server-client architecture, which delivers films on a rental basis in the existing payper-view window directly to individual computers, where the films reside for limited periods before self-destructing (under the orders of DRM software). In essence, this represents a traditional broadcast-style system, built around linear distribution and packaged commodities, which poses no threat to the existing structure of the industry and enables the studios to retain tight control over the spatial and temporal lives of their commodities in a digital form. Significantly, this model also limits the Internet to the pay-per-view window, which is unable to compete with the popular home video window, where films arrive 3 months sooner and then remain indefinitely. More generally, pay-per-view film rentals are increasingly out of touch with contemporary home video viewing habits, especially in light of the reduced cost of DVD sales and the shift towards 'unlimited', subscription-based rental models in the DVD market. The selection of content available in the pay-per-view window is also limited, as films have to leave after 2-3 months to begin a new life in the pay-television window. Under the studio model, therefore, legal Internet rental services will have small and variable libraries (in stark contrast to the cornucopia of content available on the P2P networks).
Quite simply, the studio model does not make it easier or even more attractive for consumers to acquire films over the Internet in a legal format. The studio model is also inefficient from an economic standpoint because it limits the Internet to the pay-perview window, which is only able to offer film rentals. However, the Internet can also be used for digital sales in the home video window-that is, films that are sold to consumers to permanently own (either on a hard disk or on a recordable DVD). In fact, there is substantial evidence to show that digital sales would provide the studios with higher profit margins than current DVD sales, given the absence of physical reproduction and distribution costs. The economics and profit margins of DVD sales and digital sales are summarized in Table 5 . This data have been gleaned from interviews and provides, in my view, a fair estimation of per unit operating costs and profits in the emerging digital sales channel (fixed set-up costs such as servers are not included).
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According to my interviewees, the studios could realistically sell digital films at (or slightly below) the wholesale price of a DVD (i.e. $12-15). 7 This would generate profit margins of 54-63% and 75-80%, depending on the use of a centralized (server-client) or a decentralized (P2P) architecture.
The distinction between these architectures is significant, because a decentralized system, built around legal file sharing, would theoretically generate incremental studio profits of up to $3.75 per title compared to a DVD sale. A decentralized architecture is also preferable because it does not require the same level of up front investment in 'set up' and 'operating' sunk costs (Clark and Wrigley, 1995) as a centralized architecture. For example, a centralized model requires a dedicated network of video servers and reserved Internet bandwidth. In contrast, a decentralized architecture is sustained within a distributed network (which uses the bandwidth and storage capacities of multiple computers), but may also be coordinated by some centralized servers. In addition, a decentralized architecture reduces the per unit marginal cost of digital film sales. This is based on two assumptions, which were consistently emphasized by interviewees: first, that marketing costs are likely to be lower in a file-sharing environment, given the presence of tailored recommendations and peer-based sharing, which is more effective at matching supply and demand; and second, that distribution costs are virtually zero 6 A note on the calculation of guild payments in Table 5 . Guild payments refer to the 'residual' revenues (or royalties) that are paid to talent such as actors, producers, directors and screenwriters, who are involved in the production of a film. For example, the studios pay 1.8% of DVD sales to the Writers Guild and 5.3% to the Screen Actors Guild. In the home video window, the guilds are paid a residual based upon 20% of gross revenues. However, in the pay-per-view window, the guilds are paid a residual based upon 100% of gross revenues. On a hit film, the studios typically return 25% of accountable revenues to the guilds. 7 This is despite the absence of physical packaging. In fact, the studios could justify a similar price on the basis of the convenience and portability of digital films. Here, it is instructive to consider the business model developed in the realm of digital music (e.g. iTunes), where the record labels sell albums at a price equivalent to that prevailing in the offline music market. In fact, it is argued that the record labels make higher profits per album in a digital file format compared to a CD format-a disparity that has prompted the US Department of Justice, in February 2006, to investigate the extent of oligopolistic price fixing in this nascent market.
(as bandwidth and storage is shared), with the exception of fees to consumers (in exchange for their bandwidth and storage) and minor payment processing fees. Despite the clear economic advantages of a decentralized model (and the fact that it dovetails with consumer cultures, increasingly oriented around file sharing), the studios continue to favour a centralized model. The studios have brought this technological model into existence through their general licensing stipulations, which effectively limit the supply of studio films to Internet distributors that are equipped with a centralized and rental-based architecture. At present, there are two dominant services in the US, which are able to afford the studio model (see Table 6 ). Both of these services have the support of larger corporate entities. Cinema Now is majority owned by Lions Gate Entertainment, the largest North American independent film studio, and has additional investment from technology firms Cisco and Microsoft. Meanwhile, Movie Link is a joint venture created in 2002 by MGM, Paramount, Sony Pictures, Universal and Warner Bros. 8 Movie Link was arguably created to promote the centralized model as a 'best practice' standard in this emerging market-and also, to create a legal service that would strengthen the studios' lobbying efforts for greater government protection, particularly in the run-up to legal action against file-sharing networks (in MGM v Grokster). Movie Link and Cinema Now offer a limited selection of studio films, given their designation in the pay-per-view window. However, Cinema Now operates outside the studios and has therefore been able to extend the centralized model in several new directions, largely using independent films and porn. For example, as Table 6 shows, Cinema Now also offers subscriptions and digital sales, both of which are prohibited by the studios because of ramifications for the existing structure of windows.
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The studios have promoted these services as a compelling legal alternative to P2P filesharing networks. In practice, however, Cinema Now and Movie Link have struggled to sell studio films to consumers because of the limited appeal of the studio model. On the [2004] [2005] and are insufficient to cover the high set-up and operating sunk costs of the centralized architecture. Moreover, the volume of legal rentals is tiny compared to activity on the leading P2P networks, where an estimated 2 billion studio films are downloaded every year worldwide. In summary, the studios have advanced a centralized model for Internet distribution that is inherently limited. It might be argued that the analysis presented here is little more than a brief snapshot of studio strategy at a particular juncture, and that these firms will support more robust business models as the market for file-sharing matures. Whilst this is partly true, it is my contention that the studios remain fundamentally focused on centralized models of film distribution, and that this will continue to shape their engagement with P2P technology in the foreseeable future. Like the record labels, the studios are likely to engage with legal file sharing at some point, but only when forced to do so, and in a limited form, which favours centralized servers and thick DRM over truly decentralized networks and thin/imperfect DRM. This is a critical issue, as the choices made by oligopolistic firms in the media and entertainment industries will shape the evolution of legal P2P file sharing and further, the activities of creators and consumers in this nascent economic space. In the remainder of the article, I hope to shed light on the behaviour of the Hollywood studios. Specifically, I suggest that the studios' response to the Internet is determined by the incentives and organizational context that influence executive decision-making. Like other large firms, the behaviour of the studios is constrained by the underlying structure of the industry, which consists of myriad vested interests and sunk costs (see Clark, 1994; Schoenberger, 1997) .
Understanding the strategic behaviour of the Hollywood studios: the power of incentives and context
The strategic response of the studio oligopoly to the Internet is directly shaped and constrained by the existing windowed structure of film distribution, which is dominated by a physical commodity form: sales of the DVD format. The studios continue to resist any form of engagement with legal P2P file sharing (despite the availability of evidence indicating its myriad benefits) owing to potential ramifications for DVD sales and a loss of control in the distribution process. The studios have basically favoured a centralized (server-client) rental model over a decentralized (P2P) sale-based model, which is more efficient and robust, because it makes no change to the existing structure of release windows and hence does not threaten the $15 billion revenue stream currently generated by sales of DVDs in the US each year.
The centralized model also allows the studios to pay lip service to the Internet, in a form that gives them tight (indeed, unprecedented) control over the distribution and consumption of their products in a digital and rental-based commodity form (with the help of DRM). The centralized model facilitates the distribution of temporary files to individually designated computers from a central server within the pay-per-view rental window; whereas a decentralized model would involve the redistribution of permanently stored files among and between multiple computers in a shared but secure computer network. Legal file sharing requires permanent copies of files, which are sold to consumers. To embrace legal file sharing, the studios would therefore need to offer digital sales and relocate Internet distribution within the prized home video release window, where the DVD format generates the bulk of studio revenues. There is considerable resistance to such a strategy because it could destabilize the DVD-oriented structure of distribution in the oligopoly: the studios fear that consumers might substitute DVD sales with digital sales.
Given these issues, the studios have therefore confined the Internet to the tiny payper-view window, sandwiched between home video and pay-television, where it is unable to reach its potential or generate significant revenues. The pay-per-view window has remained insignificant since its inception in the 1980s because of its timing and the limitations of the consumption experience next to other outlets, such as home video. By confining the Internet to this window, the studios are artificially limiting the development of this new market outlet for films. As long as it is confined to the pay-per-view window, the market for Internet distribution will live up to studio expectations; i.e. it will grow minimally and in a way that does not pose a threat to the DVD format. This behaviour is paradoxical and indeed, arguably suboptimal in economic and strategic terms (at least in the long run). The studios are deliberately neglecting an emerging and high margin market so as to protect a mature and lower margin market, which is actually exhibiting signs of slow down. As Table 7 shows, annual growth in US DVD sales has progressively reduced each year since the format was introduced in 1997. The latest forecasts (triangulated from interviews and consultancy reports) predict that DVD sales growth will reduce by 50% each year, until 2008 when sales are expected to flatten and enter a decline. Note, however, that this data does not include any projected sales increases from the next-generation DVD format (see below).
The strategic response of the studios reflects a general problem in oligopolies: that firms in this kind of industry face difficulties in managing their income over time-and in particular, determining when and how to create new products and revenue streams, whilst others are refigured or destroyed. From a Schumpeterian perspective, the executives who guide these firms are generally paid to avoid strategies of 'creative destruction'. Over time, firms need to focus on larger and safer markets to sustain an ever-climbing rate of growth. One of the 'bittersweet results of success is that as companies become large, they lose sight of small and emerging markets', which are of longterm importance to an industry (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000, p. 70) . Thus, large and successful firms tend to focus on mature and established markets but neglect emerging markets, even if there is ample evidence to justify an early response (Schoenberger, 1997) . The studios exhibit these general characteristics. However, to fully understand the strategic behaviour of studio executives, we must examine the incentives they face, as well as the organizational and institutional context in which executive decision-making takes place. These issues lay at the forefront of my research: the findings are organized under four headings. I have incorporated anonymous interview quotes into the narrative to shed light on the key issues through the eyes of senior executives. Hopefully, this will help to construct a more active, contextually sensitive and agent-specific picture of the studios' oligopolistic behaviour (compare Markusen, 1999) .
(1) The legal and territorial structure of asset ownership The media and entertainment industries are characterized by a unique structure of asset ownership and distribution, based around different types of legal rights, which create artificial levels of exclusivity and scarcity through space and time. In the context of the film industry, different rights holders control various aspects of the film, such as the right to distribute the product in a particular territory during a particular stage of the product lifecycle. For these reasons, the geographical structure of asset ownership and distribution in the film industry is extraordinarily complex and varies by film title, release window and territory. This imposes significant restraints on the strategic behaviour of the studios and their ability to support the development of any kind of legal Internet distribution services, centralized or decentralized, as the distribution of films over a new medium such as the Internet requires clearance from the relevant rights holders. The studios must ensure that they hold the appropriate distribution rights before distributing and selling a film over the Internet in a digital format. In particular, there are two types of legal right that need to be investigated-general distribution rights and rights to the music in the film. The cost of clearing these rights can be substantial, especially for older titles where the structure of asset ownership is less clear. In addition, the studios must convert their films into a digital format for sale and distribution over the Internet (a relatively inexpensive process that costs approximately $5000 per title). In the case of Sony Pictures (now incorporating MGM), Universal and Warner Bros., which have the largest film libraries in the industry, the task of investigating and clearing the appropriate rights is clearly a formidable and costly barrier to entry into the market for legal Internet distribution. For many titles, the size of the market for legal downloads is not yet large enough to justify the costs associated with making available the content. Table 8 estimates the total cost of licensing and digitizing the oldest 50% of the studios' film libraries, where the issue of rights clearance is likely to be most complex and expensive.
Therefore, the cost of Internet licensing is significant. On the basis of Table 8 , it would cost the six studios over $1.7 billion to open up the oldest 50% of their libraries, or 4.4% of their overall worldwide revenues in 2004. However, at present the market for legal Internet distribution is too small, risky and uncertain to justify an investment of this kind. Interviewees estimated that the studios earned less than $5 million from US-based Internet pay-per-view rentals in 2004, or 0.12% of their worldwide revenues in that same year. In this context, the studios face a strategic dilemma:
We need to open up our libraries and get legal content out there . . . onto the Internet . . . to drive consumer adoption, tackle piracy and grow the market . . . the flipside is that the market is too small to warrant our investment. But and here's the Catch-22 . . . the market can't grow if we don't take that risk and license content. It's a real dilemma that will take a courageous move by one of the studios to resolve. (Senior Vice President, Studio: original emphasis)
The distribution of films over the Internet also potentially clashes with existing forms of distribution, which are built upon a complex structure of territorially-defined rights. The timing of release windows varies across space, such that at any point in time, a film will be at a different phase in its product lifecycle in different territories. Therefore, studio executives are concerned that Internet distribution could risk the premature and unauthorized 'collapse' of release windows:
Release windows are different across territories . . . so imagine if one of our titles was available at a legal online service in the pay-per-view window in the US, but at the same time consumers in another market, where the title was licensed exclusively to pay-TV, could still access it. The Internet messes in a big way with the geography of windows and deals . . . . (Senior Vice President, Studio; emphasis added) This concern is slowing the response of the studios to the Internet, and helps explain why some high-value franchises (such as James Bond or Lord of the Rings) have still not been licensed to the Internet, even to secure centralized services such as Cinema Now or Movie Link. However, this concern is paradoxical given that the latest DRM technologies and IP-address geo-filtering techniques (combined with online registration and verification of billing addresses) are able to ensure that digital films are only delivered to specified geographic audiences, through both centralized and P2P models-indeed, with far greater efficacy than the 'regional' codes that the studios have used to segment their global DVD empire. Going forward, however, it is likely that the studios will fall back on geo-filtering and DRM technologies to remap the Internet in accordance with existing territorial agreements. Despite being spaceless, therefore, Internet distribution needs to be tethered to particular places and regions to gain the approval of powerful copyright owners (see Lenert, 2004) . In the long run, though, the appeal of the Internet, even in a secure, geographically bounded form, will be tainted by the studios' ongoing romance with the DVD. In the course of my research, it soon became clear that the studio executives that formulate strategic plans recognize and appreciate the benefits of legal file sharing; but that in practice, they are unable to harness a peer-based model because they operate in large publicly traded companies, where they are expected to minimize risk and secure incremental revenue growth from mature markets, such as theatrical exhibition (still the artistic and commercial hearth of film), DVD sales and pay-television. In short, studio executives have incentives to protect windows:
As executives working for large public companies, we have a fiduciary responsibility to our shareholders to do two things. First, protect our assets from piracy and offer legal alternatives to piracy. But this is offset by a second and vital factor -we must maximize the value of our products in existing markets and minimize our exposure to risk, like investing in an unproven market such as the Internet, which could easily cannibalize our growth if mismanaged.
(President, Studio) Sure, we all recognize the benefits -the 'disruptive power' that you mention -of the Internet . . . It makes sense to send all our content out there to different nodes and hubs, but it's . . . about whether we want to develop this market at all . . . in an aggressive sense. It's a hard sell to our top executives . . . Why deliberately upset a system that works? (Senior Vice President, Studio)
More specifically, studio executives are charged with protecting sales of the physical commodity form, the DVD. They do not want to pursue any strategy that could endanger that lucrative empire. Over the next decade, the studios aim to revitalize DVD sales by deploying and reversioning films on a new generation of 'high-definition' discs. The industry standard for this DVD format is still to be decided; but its broad aims are clear. First, the discs will have significantly higher storage capacities (up to 50 GB, compared to 4.7 GB on the current generation of DVDs). Therefore, the discs will be able to store films in a higher quality format, in addition to a greater amount of 'valueadded' content (such as deleted scenes, production footage, documentaries and multiple camera angles). The studios hope that the transition to high-definition DVD will be even more profound than the transition from VHS cassettes to DVD; and that consumers will be willing to upgrade their libraries to the new format, generating a potentially significant revenue stream. Second, the new DVD format will feature stronger (or 'thicker') encryption technologies (which are permitted and protected in the US by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998), enabling the studios to impose much greater levels of control over their films in a physical commodity form (e.g. limiting copying, backups, sharing, etc.). The studios are therefore focused on preserving the physical commodity form rather than also exploring digital commodity forms and in particular, legal file sharing. In economic terms, the high-definition DVD format is predicted to generate high profit margins (in the range of 70-80% according to interviewees, therefore broadly similar to digital sales). The new format also dovetails with the existing disc-oriented structure of the film industry and more generally, the centralized mode of reproduction that defines the media oligopoly of which the studios are a critical component-that is, the linear distribution of packaged commodities to consumers. At an operational scale, the studios have incentives to preserve and reinvent the DVD form because it will be able to draw on existing sunk costs, both in the form of tangible assets (e.g. physical reproduction plants, which the studios own and use in joint ventures with other studios and technology firms) and intangible assets (e.g. skills and knowledge relating to the packaging and marketing of discs and boxed collections). In contrast, the Internet is an unknown, unproven and risky market: studio executives generally see it as an inherently 'insecure' and 'leaky' place for their content, which moreover requires new competencies and strategic alliances with new, unknown partners, such as P2P firms (many of whom, including the popular Bit Torrent network, are now seeking to acquire the trust of Hollywood as legitimate operators). Overall, the strategic behaviour of the studios remains focused on the DVD format. This strategy is held in place by at least two other general factors, which again relate to the organizational and institutional context of executive decision-making.
(3) The power of vested interests Internally, the organization of the studios also favours the preservation of the status quo and the protection of existing revenue streams:
The studios are composed of big businesses, home video, pay-TV, etc., which are essentially managed as separate businesses . . . These are large, well-established groups, with powerful vested interests at stake, mini-fiefdoms if you like. Instigating change among these groups and managing trade-offs among those groups is incredibly challenging . . . it takes a long time for us to adapt and respond. (Consultant: emphasis added) Over the past decade, the Presidents of the home video divisions have become extremely powerful in the film industry. Given the size of the DVD market, these elites now have the power to influence which films get produced (based on projected home video revenues); and more generally, the nature and direction of studio strategy:
The sheer success of DVD has meant that home video presidents have been admitted into the 'inner circle' of studio decision-making . . . They get heard because although they are basically packaged goods merchants -which is kind of disdained by the creative types -they have produced huge revenue growth for the studios and the conglomerates . . . The studio chiefs basically want the home video guys to do part 2 of the DVD story and replicate the revenues all over again. (Vice President, Studio) The vested power of the home video divisions is also evident with respect to the use of 'value-added' DVD content, such as documentaries, deleted scenes, interviews and so on. To date, the home video divisions have refused to license any of this content for Internet distribution because of its value in a physical commodity form. At present, this content is produced exclusively for the DVD market, where it is deployed in the form of dedicated discs and special edition boxed sets. In theory, this content could enhance the appeal of legal alternatives to file-sharing networks (where raw files are shared). But in practice, this strategy has been prevented because of concerns that digital film sales (with the same packaging and special features) could negatively impact DVD revenues:
The production of special features, behind the scenes documentaries and so on is now a massive area of activity, an industry in itself really . . . which takes up an increasing amount of creative energy and studio investment every year. Its hardly surprising that the studio's home video executives are reluctant to hand over control over this prized content -[which has] helped to drive DVD [sales] revenues -for use in a tiny and unproven market outlet like the Internet. (Executive Vice President, Studio) External to the studios, there are also powerful vested interests that preserve the discoriented structure of the film industry. For example, retailers such as Wal-Mart, Best Buy and Target (which account for 70% of the US market for DVD sales-representing another oligopoly in effect) are able to restrict the speed and extent to which the studios can adopt embrace digital commodities and Internet distribution, which would lead to some degree of 'disintermediation' between studios, retailers and consumers:
The majors have to operate in the context of institutional restraints and existing matrices of deals. Changing the window for Internet distribution could provoke a backlash by big retailers, who may reduce the exposure of [a particular studio's] content in the store. Basically, there is a whole power structure in place that's evolved across TV and film over the past 100 years that causes the people in the industry to move very slowly when new technologies come along . . . We operate in a fragile ecosystem -digital [sales] over the Internet could negatively impact sales of DVD titles in the stores, which the retailers basically use as 'loss leaders' to bring people into the store when they are first released, to buy other things. DVD is critical to them and they will defend the status quo to the death. (Senior Vice President, Studio) Therefore, the strategic behaviour of studio executives is constrained by the power and vested interests of firms in the DVD retail market. This resonates with the work of Christensen and Bower (1996) , who have argued that large and successful firms are often unable to effectively respond to disruptive technological changes that conflict with the interests and demands of existing customers in mature markets.
(4) The risk-averse nature of executive behaviour The current obsession with the physical DVD commodity form must also be understood in the context of executive behaviour. The executives that guide the studios (both at an operational level, in the divisions, and at board level) are inherently risk-averse because of the asymmetric financial performance of films. The high risks associated with film production demand that high-ranking studio executives exercise a high level of caution, conservatism and risk-aversion on the distribution side of the industry. The studios are essentially a group of venture capitalists, which invest (on average) $142 million in the production, marketing and international distribution of a film title (MPAA, 2004) . Films must cascade through a kaleidoscope of well-defined and carefully balanced release windows to recoup their costs (a point which only 40% of films ever reach), which is why studio executives guard the prevailing structure of release windows so vehemently. In this context, executives are prone to initially resist any proposed changes in distribution, as their response to the Internet and previous technologies attests, from cable television to home video. Rather than explore ways of harnessing its disruptive potential, executives have preferred to minimize risk and force fit the Internet within the parameters of their existing business model, by confining it to the pay-per-view release window.
In the course of my research, I encountered a 'not on my watch' philosophy in some of the studios, among executives in presidential and board level positions (compare Dekom and Sealey, 2003) . That is, these executives were unwilling to formulate, pursue or even suggest strategies that would disrupt the status quo and threaten their own well-heeled positions, not least because many were within 5-10 years of retirement. On the one hand, many expressed a serious belief that they would be in retirement by the time illegal file sharing begins to have a noticeable and negative impact on industry revenues-even though the economic impact of file sharing remains ambiguous (and possibly, even additive). On the other hand, others recognized the projected benefits of legal file sharing but explained that they were reluctant to explore its disruptive potential because they were unlikely to enjoy the economic benefits. As Leyshon et al. (2004, p. 64) put it, the highly precarious nature of executive employment . . . discourages the [entertainment] industry from embarking upon long-term processes of restructuring as those that initiate such measures are rarely around long enough to reap their rewards.
Rather, executives generally prefer to focus on mature and proven markets, such as DVD sales and pay-television, where they are able to quickly accumulate both economic and cultural capital, through safe and respected deals. It is vital to recognize that the principal decision-makers in the studios have other and bigger deals to play with and develop as their projects . . . namely, milking the DVD cash cow and closing big deals with pay-TV networks, and so on. In the bigger scheme of studio strategy, the Internet is still way down the list, even though it has potentially transformative implications for how we buy and use media. (Consultant) Further, there are limited economic or cultural incentives for senior executives to risk their careers and reputation (a critical and highly treasured commodity in Hollywood) on an unproven market, and worse, being held accountable for any potential failure:
These guys have the Hollywood lifestyle . . . the cars, the house, the salary, the bonuses, you name it . . . why risk all that for a market that's literally like a fly buzzing around the biggest cash cow in the industry -the DVD? (Consultant) Overall, to follow the work of Schoenberger (1997) , the Internet clashes with the 'social world' in which studio executives happily live and go about their daily business. The technology demands new approaches to the strategic management of space and time in the form of changes to the pattern of release windows. However, executives in large firms such as the studios are generally unable to pioneer the creative destruction of revenue streams and the economic landscape more broadly. Over time, such managers cultivate and defend a specific image of the firm and its place on the economic landscape (Schoenberger, 2000a) . Quite simply, they attempt to remake the world in their image by exercising their strategic imagination and influencing resource allocation decisions. The identity, careers and reputation of such executives often become so intricately tied to this image that they are likely to resist any strategic changes that may threaten either the firm's current structure or their position within that structure, even if those changes are theoretically in the competitive interests of the firm in the long-term.
Consequently, there are 'tremendous incentives to stabilize the firm around a known set of rules', which provide executives with market growth and job security in the short term (Schoenberger, 2000b, p. 326) . In the Hollywood studios, these rules centre on the spatial and temporal structure of release windows, which have periodically become locked in to specific configurations before shifting to incorporate a new delivery format (Scott, 2002) . Crucially, the Hollywood studios have successfully adapted to changes in technology over the long run, as their current global success attests. Historically, the development of new economic geographies of film distribution (which harness the disruptive potential of a technology) has relied upon so-called 'visionary elites', situated at senior levels in the studios (e.g. Chairman, Chief Executive Officers). These individuals typically recognize the long-run commercial potential of an emerging market and also have the power (e.g. a successful career and peer recognition) to forge deals and compromises between other 'risk-averse' groups that control assets in the film industry. As such, they have the ability to instigate and manage periods of industrial transition. It is plausible to assume that the eventual adoption of legal file sharing in Hollywood will take place in a similarly fragmented fashion, perhaps with one or two studios blazing a path. In the long run, however, the underlying oligopolistic agenda of the studios is likely to constrain, rather than nurture, the market for legal file sharing. As I suggest in the conclusion to this article, the oligopolistic behaviour of the studios (and their parents) raises some worrying questions about the future shape of creativity, distribution and consumption in the film industry, and beyond, in a digital age.
Conclusions: oligopolistic firms and the development of new markets
The commercial development of new markets and technologies often takes place in a bifurcated fashion, particularly in oligopolies. Specifically, it is possible to make a broad distinction between processes of exploration and exploitation (Tushman and Anderson, 2004) . First, the exploration of emerging markets tends to be pioneered by smaller firms, outside the orbit of incumbent firms. In general, the former are attracted by the growth prospects of emerging niche markets, whereas the latter have a fiduciary responsibility to secure incremental growth from mature mass markets in a riskaverse fashion. In other words, there is a difference in behaviour and incentives, which is tied to the context in which decision-making takes place. Second, a tipping point occurs when emerging markets obtain a critical mass, attracting the interest of incumbents. In a few cases, this process of exploitation might lead to the displacement of incumbents and the ascendance of innovative 'first movers' (see Christensen, 1997) . In most cases, however, the growth of a new market actually depends upon incumbents, given their assets and market power. Generally, innovators are more likely to 'sell out' rather than challenge the ruling oligopoly (Klepper, 2002) .
The collision between Hollywood (a mature oligopoly overseen by six studios) and the Internet (a decentralized P2P architecture) exhibits these general theoretical characteristics. The rise of P2P file sharing has been problematic both for the studios and their corporate parents because it portends a radically different mode of economic reproduction for intellectual property, built around secure P2P file sharing, and in turn, a loss of oligopolistic control. These firms have attacked the P2P networks under the discursive (and seemingly unassailable) banner of piracy, property rights and theft. In particular, they have argued that P2P file sharing is morally wrong and economically reprehensible, and poses a hazard to future investments in creativity. In practice, however, the campaign against file sharing is in many ways merely a subplot to a much larger and contentious drama, centred on how we create, fund, use, own and share creative works in a digital and networked economy.
Clearly, this shift clashes with the prevailing and highly centralized mode of reproduction in the media oligopoly, which rests on packaged commodities, linear distribution and the maximization of control via intellectual property rights. The lead firms in this industry are understandably threatened by any potential dilution of their control; despite evidence that the reconstitution and redistribution of their commodities, in a secure digital form, is likely to be economically efficient, financially rewarding and socially valuable. As I have tried to show in this article, the studio oligopoly has broadly sought to subdue the disruptive impact of the Internet, and so incorporate it into the industry in a restrictive model-namely, a centralized server-client architecture, characterized by the one-way distribution of digital commodities that are programmed to self-destruct. The oligopolistic response of the studios is suboptimal in the long run as it deliberately marginalizes a powerful and potentially lucrative new outlet. Nonetheless, it is vital to recognize that the oligopolistic behaviour of studio executives is rationalized and constrained by the organizational context in which executive decision-making takes place. In effect, executives are paid to preserve the existing industry structure, as opposed to remaking it into new, unknown and risky configurations.
My primary contention, therefore, is that the media oligopoly and its lead divisions-the record labels, the studios and the television networks-are institutionally incapable of exploring and defining the commercial parameters of legal P2P file sharing. As a result, the bulk of innovation in this realm is taking place on the creative and economic margins of the entertainment industry, with the support of 'independent' content, which is subject to fewer legal restrictions in a digital or physical commodity form. In particular, the development of legal file-sharing services has relied upon music, video games and recently, films from outside the media oligopoly (as described in Table 2 , above). Indeed, the growing availability of engaging and otherwise marginalized content over the Internet could conceivably encroach upon the market share of mass produced, formulaic 'blockbuster' content (Scott, 2002 (Scott, , 2003 . Ultimately, however, the long-term growth, or exploitation, of this market will depend upon premium content from within the media oligopoly, which has the broadest appeal and economic value both online and offline. And as noted, oligopolistic behaviour is a logical and enduring response to the unpredictable economics of media and entertainment. Therefore, the media oligopoly has the capacity to shape the development of Internet distribution in a form and direction that is favourable to its interests.
Although there are signs of a possible rapprochement with P2P file sharing, the media oligopoly remains intent on pursuing centralized models of distribution where possible. As noted, the US record labels have only licensed content to centralized filesharing services, which are able to coordinate and monitor the P2P transfer of songs (which are encased with thick DRM). Meanwhile, the studios have not yet licensed any content onto a legal file-sharing service, given the important implications for 'release windows', which do not affect the record labels.
11 The studios have also announced plans for digital sales, in the home video window, but using a centralized architecture. To the extent that there is change in the strategic direction of the oligopoly, it is occurring in a fragmented and divergent fashion. Owing to differences in corporate ownership and elite leadership, some of the labels and studios have been relatively more progressive in their approach to the Internet-for example, Sony Pictures, the only studio to have direct organizational ties to consumer electronics hardware, which is in part relying upon legal download services for future growth. But even in these firms, socalled 'visionary elites' and strategic planners face difficulties in educating other incumbent elites about the need to admit legal file sharing into the studios' 'inner circle'.
The most worrying long run development, however, is the media oligopoly's incessant pursuit of 'thick' and overly protective 'DRM' technology in this emerging market. Clearly, DRM is needed, in some form, to enable and legalize file sharing, as well as digital tinkering and remixing. It can impose spatial and temporal boundaries around digital commodities, thereby strengthening their excludability and securing revenues for copyright owners. Nonetheless, as noted, a balance in DRM design is desirable, and critical to the commercial development of file sharing. That is, 'thin' forms of DRM protection are needed, so as to protect and institutionalize fair uses and derivative uses by consumers and creators. Otherwise the most promising aspects of this new market will be stymied. Unfortunately, the default response in the media oligopoly is to thicken DRM, so as to eliminate any unauthorized uses and extract maximum value from each commodity, in a centralized architecture that inevitably strips the Internet of its underlying power and efficiency (Lessig, 2002 (Lessig, , 2004 .
In this extreme form, DRM portends a shift towards a darker scenario, in which oligopolistic control over products (online and offline, in encrypted physical formats) is perfected and consumer choice is reduced. In the long-term, this shift might mean, for example, that we are unable to backup a music CD, view a DVD at a friend's house, or store a recorded television show for longer than a day-activities that have been taken for granted, but are now threatened by the extreme response of the media oligopoly to the ill-defined 'threat' of P2P file sharing. The steady deployment of thick DRM also has dire implications for the creative and experimental basis of the copyright industries more generally, as it locks away content behind 'electronic gates' and prohibits any use, including transformative uses, such as criticism, quoting, sampling, editing, whereby information is developed into new forms (Bollier, 2002 (Bollier, , 2005 . As such, DRM increasingly represents a form of 'privatized copyright law', enforced by the media oligopoly rather than the state, which facilitates the enclosure of the public domain, the indefinite extension of copyright terms, the evisceration of choice, both for consumers and future creators, and worse, the underuse of the 'informational commons' (Boyle, 2003; Samuelson, 2003) .
This signifies a broader and problematic shift in the relationship between the media oligopoly and the regulatory state, particularly in the US. Over the past 20 years, the later has granted unprecedented powers to the former, by extending copyright terms and by authorizing the use of thick DRM, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998).
12 In this context, there is an urgent need for greater public debate, and 12 As Sell (2003) shows, intellectual property rights have undergone a process of extension and statesponsored re-regulation (ironically, within a neoliberal context of de-regulation). This has occurred for at least two reasons: first, the growth of oligopolies in lucrative knowledge-based sectors, including media, entertainment, pharmaceuticals and software (and by default, an increase in the lobbying power of incumbent firms); and second, a greater recognition within government of the competitive importance of knowledge-based industries in a global and liberalized economy.
also further grounded case studies of the kind presented here, to conceptualize the ongoing collision between Hollywood (as well as the broader media oligopoly) and the Internet-and above all, the ways in which the latter can achieve its full potential, whilst also safeguarding the economic reproduction of the former. Ultimately, some form of state intervention (and by default, a fundamental review of thick DRM and the new powers it grants to large corporations) may well be required to legalize and institutionalize the potential of P2P file sharing. 13 There is now such a great cultural gulf emerging between the media oligopoly and its consumers that state intervention may be the only way to kick-start the commercial development of P2P file sharing, in a form that hopefully balances the interests of creators, corporations and consumers.
